Comment: Can We Win in Afghanistan?

Posted by johnhouk on Sep 11, 2009
 Gary H. Johnson, Jr. has provided some insight into the Afghan theatre of war that is very enlightening. It is a response to a post by Mark Noonan entitled, “Can We Win in Afghanistan?”

I encourage you to visit Johnson’s website that focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan in which the Taliban and al Qaeda are perpetuating Radical Islam and terrorism: The AfPak Reader.

JRH 9/11/09
***********************
AfPak Reader Essays
Comment: Can We Win in Afghanistan?
Gary H. Johnson, Jr.
Comment sent: Wed 9/9/2009 4:02 PM

That is the question that will haunt the Obama Administration through 2012. Below are a few journals I wrote back on July 19th and 20th on the topic of winning in the AfPak. Following my frontend attempts to map the threat, I have started The AfPak Reader to get down with the business of figuring out who our enemies are and where they are, where our troops are and where the frontlines are forming. It is a complicated maze of information, but it is something we can study and understand.

One note - victory in Afghanistan is no longer an option. We are not in a war...we are in a contingency operation. Therefore, the best we can hope for is a "success". Victory in the AfPak was the first casualty of the Obama Administration's foreign policy language shifts.

GHJJ (9/9/09, 4:35pmEST)
_________________________

July 19, 2009

It has become apparent that the aim of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan has shifted and mutated and fallen to the winds of political change. The daily headlines of the Talibani activity from the AfPak region stream across the internet in a wave of school burnings, village uprisings, bomb blasts, prison breaks, and is punctuated by Predator bolts from the blue and forward actions that typically yield dozens of Taliban deaths for each fallen coalition soldier.

The activity of Al Qaeda and its affiliates from its Uzbek and Pashtun nationalist allies to its hardline ISI associates of the Afghan and Paki frontier are a blur of tangled intertribal agreements in which confusion is the lens through which to measure the success of the efforts of NATO, the US Armed Forces and Western Diplomats.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda's number two, has just released a book on detecting and eradicating Western spies. When did he find the time to write? Isn't he on the run?

The opium lines have not faltered. Al Qaeda and its allies have retreated to FATA and NWFP safehavens. In the process, Al Qaeda and its allies have destroyed bridges and munitions storage depots to continually cut off the NATO supply lines in Pakistan which provide three quarters of the fuel, ammunition and armor to our soldiers in Afghanistan.

Not two months ago, Taliban insurgents pushed within sixty miles of the capital of Pakistan, establishing dominance and Shariah law along the way.

Nuclear weapons are teetering in the balance, and the response of the U.S. State Department was that the dire eventuality of a nuclear armed Taliban or Al Qaeda could not even be contemplated.

It seems odd to those of us in America who are engaged on the AfPak issue that the "Global War on Terror" has been shifted into what are coined "Overseas Contingency Operations" and that the contingency of Al Qaeda and its allies taking Islamabad is not something which has even been contemplated. Afterall, shouldn't a contingency plan already have been in the works? Alarm bells are ringing. Our troops are dying and we were all beginning to wonder why we are in Afghanistan if Al Qaeda is finding safehaven in the tribal belt of western and northwestern Pakistan. If we are in a war with a nonstate actor, why do No-Go zones exist which are delimited and defined by state borders?

The questions on the issue far outnumbered the answers as Bush's second term ended and Obama's presidency began. And in the six months since Obama took the helm, the policy shifts in the region have been met with little analysis in the Media and even less vindication for the effort from the upper echelons of government.

GHJJ (1:44amEST)
______________________
July 19, 2009

On July 15th, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton participated in a townhall of sorts at the Council on Foreign Relations, to clarify the aims of the U.S. Government in its foreign policy initiatives. Secretary Clinton directly tilts at the problem of the Taliban in Afghanistan, stating, "...Americans often ask why do we ask our young men and women to risk their lives in Afghanistan when Al Qaeda's leadership is in neighboring Pakistan? That question deserves a good answer. We and our allies fight in Afghanistan because the Taliban protects Al Qaeda and depends on it for support, sometimes, coordinating activities. In other words, to eliminate Al Qaeda, we must also fight the Taliban."

Now, while this answer does nothing to determine the nature or scope or depth of the Taliban effort in Afghanistan, its relation to the poppy cultivation and its ratlines, or the level of public support for Talibani efforts inside of Afghanistan, it is instructive since it shows that our aim and target is the Taliban support network of Al Qaeda. It is only complicated; however, when she hedges, "Now, we understand that not all those who fight with the Taliban support Al Qaeda or believe in the extremist policies the Taliban pursued when in power. And, today, we and our Afghan allies stand ready to welcome anyone supporting the Taliban who renounces Al Qaeda, lays down their arms, and is willing to participate in the free and open society that is enshrined in the Afghan constitution."

The last time I checked, the Afghanistan Constitution is based on Shariah Law. To make such a statement from the position of Secretary of State is to provide moral equivalence and legitimacy to the brand of Freedom found in Shariah Law as that practiced in the Western world's more democratic institutions. Moreover, to initiate a call for those who support al Qaeda to lay down their arms and switch sides demonstrates the level of confusion which exists at the highest cabinet in the U.S. over the nature of the battle our military and its coalition allies are embroiled in against the al Qaeda support network.

Sure, Clinton parrots the Obama line, when she says, "In Afghanistan and Pakistan, our goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies and to prevent their return to either country." But, to couple the goal of military action with such a conflicted understanding of the threat demonstrates at best uncertainty and at worst delusion - and in the end, blurs the line between combatant and civilian to the point of guaranteed hesitation in a firefight. We either do not understand who our allies are and who is harboring or supporting terrorist aims, or we do not understand the nature of the pull evidenced by Islamism's political and militia branches upon the disparate tribes or the disaffected youth of the region. But most disturbing of all, is the notion that we are announcing our strategy to the world, which includes civilian involvement, "Our further approach is to ensure that our civilian and military efforts operate in a coordinated and complimentary fashion where we are engaged in conflict," Clinton continues, "This is the core of our strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq where we are integrating our efforts with international partners.... Equally important, we are sending hundreds of direct-hire American civilians to lead a new efforts to strengthen the Afghan government, help rebuild the once-vibrant agriculture sector, create jobs, encourage the rule of law, expand opportunities for women, and train the Afghan police."

To announce a strategy of war, publicly, is a mark of transparency; however, since our enemy is technologically savvy, it is also a lesson in either hubris or insanity.

The Afghan theatre has recently witnessed the kidnapping of a U.S. soldier and the propaganda video of his captivity. What is the likelihood that ratcheting up civilian NGO members in the region, and announcing the intention, will increase Al Qaeda's targetting of and kidnapping of U.S. personnel? Besides the virtual guarantee of future headlines revolving around captured U.S. civilians, the focus on rebuilding the once vibrant agricultural sector virtually guarantees that opium harvesting will continue ad infinitum. The remarkable thing about the Secretary's speech to CFR; however, is how little focus was placed on the Taliban's history, the make up of its elements, the leadership involved, and the numbers of adherents or their chief bases of action and support throughout Afghanistan. No mention is made of the Islamist reality of the Taliban.

Instead of Islamists, they are labeled as extremists. Instead of noting that the Taliban are not a single unified force, but rather a plethora of Frankenstein monster constructs of the ISI in Pakistan, that still in large part receive marching orders from deep within the Pakistani government and intelligence agencies, the Taliban are treated as a group of guerillas with no ideology or driving force other than their support of Al Qaeda or the simple desire for a paycheck.

When Clinton asks for those who are willing to join the Afghan Allies to lay down their arms, she notes that they may not be in full agreement with Taliban policies in the past, but she sees no need to enumerate the atrocities committed by the Taliban over the course of the last quarter of a century, including their takeover of Kabul in 1996, their murder of hundreds of tribal elders of the Pashtun, their enslavement of women, their indoctrination of children to an al Qaeda centric worldview of hate, or their expulsion of the international NGOs in the late 1990s. Nor does Clinton see purpose, apparently in including the fact that the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Taliban are both "students" of a chiefly "Deoband" school of madrassa instruction, which are sponsored in largest part by Saudi Arabia's Wahhab establishment.

No note is made to differentiate the Afghani and Pakistani and Arab contingents of the threat. No attempt is made by the State Department's chief spokeswoman about the fact that 20,000 madrassas of the Deobandi persuasion, the majority of which are centered on the Durand line, are churning out radical Islamists which are stretching their influence into Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyztan, Khazakstan, Russia, China, Bangladesh, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, and downwards even to the reaches of Africa and the Phillipines. Where was Madam Secretary's mention of the hundreds of mule trucks a day which ferry their way through multiple Taliban poll tax checkpoints, delivering opium one way and AK-47s and symtec explosives on the return home? The ideological threat of the "taliban" is growing and spreading in multiple directions in radical Islamist flavor, utilizing nationalist causes and intelligence cover, Saudi largesse and Western blindness to operate as a transnational network of terrorist incubators.

So, when Hillary Clinton decides to give a good answer to the American people concerned about the mission of the US Soldiers in Afghanistan, all of the complex realities of the Taliban are dismissed, and the conflict is simplified to remove the sting of religion from the context of the fight: U.S. and coalition soldiers are mired in a battle against "extremists" in an effort to strengthen a government, which (just happens) to be based on Shariah Law. So, at the end of the day, in terms of defining the enemy, the first "wrong reason" our soldiers are dying in Afghanistan is for the solidification and strengthening of a constitutionalized Shariah Law, which is considered to be "corrupt", by both the local civilians we aim to protect as well as the Talib, since it is a form of Shariah that has been put in place by and is somewhat beholdened to Western interests.

Through Obama's initiatives, the Western sense of tolerance for local customs, then, has morphed from a shrugging multicultural relativism accomodating Islam's norms into a staunch enabling of Islamism's religious activism. This fact is evidenced at the state level by Afghanistan's President Karzai signing into law an edict which allowed marital rape. Sure, Obama gave him harsh words, calling the bill "abhorrent" and the law has been placed back on the table for reconsideration, but it has not been rescinded.

By labeling the enemy "extremists" our state department has decidedly kicked the "Radical Islamist" can down the road to the possible ruin of the world while at the same time legitimizing Shariah Law's "enshrined freedoms". By pursuing a "regional stability operations" posture rather than an "eradicate terrorists and those who harbor them" posture, our government has denied the reality that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and Iran are pursuing policies of "strategic depth", while it is seeking to reconcile with localized elements of the threat, angling to bribe warlords and tribal leaders, all in a process of engagement that leaves our soldiers dying for a diplomacy of capitulation.

So, when considering the political and diplomatic thought of our new President, for Obama to have described Afghanistan as "the right war" and Iraq as "the wrong war", while pursuing an outreach mission to the Muslim World, it is undeniable that his assessment is not only simplistic and naive, it is a suicidal capitulation to the dictates and norms of Shariah Law. "Talib" means "student". These are not students of extremism, they are students of Shariah Law.

GHJJ (12:45pmEST)
___________________

July 20, 2009

The overall philosophy of the AfPak Strategy is to develop the capacity of the two governments and economies to maintain as sovereign countries. On the military side, the lessons of Iraq's surge would be utilized as 17,000 more troops would be pushed into the theatre; however, unlike any other mission the American public has witnessed, 4,000 advisers would also be sent in to coordinate the USAID and NGO civilian effort. Development through diplomacy and statecraft is not feasible, however, without a contact group which includes China, Russia, and Iran, in the Obama framework.

This is one of the reasons he was seeking direct talks with Iran against conventional wisdom, and why he has recently agreed to a host of disarming policies with Medvedev to earn the right to transport weaponry from Russian airbases and groundroutes into volatile areas of the region. The upheaval in Iran was met with silence by the Obama team precisely because they were more interested in a partner in the AfPak region than siezing on an opportunity to capitalize on a seismic shift in the internal politics of the Shia Republic, whose ratlines snake through Western Afghanistan and into Baluchistan. In full, the development and diplomacy initiatives of the Obama Administration are forcing USAID and other NGOs to revamp their programs and the international community to rethink their aid programs via the new focus of civilian support, not to mention focusing attention on the Senate approval of billions in new NGO support in every military funding vote.

The QDDR announced last week by Secretary Hillary Clinton is designed to meet the all consuming and comprehensive challenge of coordinating civilian and military activity in a focused and effective foreign relations policy. The two "D"s stand for Diplomacy and Development - and the QDDR project of the State Department, modeled on the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Report, according to top man Jack Lew, will not be complete until the beginning of Obama's second year in office. The inability to place a political whip into place to head USAID is directly due to the strong increase in coordination and collaboration that will be necessary between USAID's umbrella of NGOs and the US Armed Forces in both training exercises and policy initiatives, as well as in forward stability operations areas and the ROZ; not to mention the fact that a huge increase in bribe money that will necessarily, per Isobel Coleman's April analysis at CFR, need to have a ground up focus and less focus on oversight on tangible asset allocation and more focus on NGO successes in the area of local civilian livelihoods, accepting the inevitable losses as a cost of doing business.

So, in this arena, another "wrong reason" for US soldiers dying in Afghanistan is for development efforts geared toward winning the peace through bribery, diplomacy, civilian involvement, International slush fund creation all aimed at recreating some mythical former glory of Afghanistan standing as the bread basket of Central Asia, with absolutely zero indication of how wheat will fair in a lopsided competition with poppies...and only vague references to a focus on poppy eradication to isolate and de-fund Al Qaeda and the Taliban through token narcotics prosecutions for those who are not paying tribute to the Afghan government in a manner that is fitting of a patriotic warlord.

While US military deaths since the beginning of the effort in Afghanistan have not reached 700 in over seven years of battle, the Afghanistan civilian population has been heavily affected. Last year alone, the Afghan government claims over 800 civilians were killed in military actions by coalition forces. So, too, in the NWFP and FATA region of Pakistan, US Predator Drones have recently accounted for the targeted assassinations of dozens of key Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders and the destruction of multiple terrorist hideouts. In the process, local government and Pakistan officials have claimed that hundreds of civilians have been killed in dronestrike collateral damage. The political and diplomatic repercussions of these civilian deaths have exacted a toll in terms of support for US involvement in the AfPak. Admiral Mullen, representing the top brass, on May 18th, noted as much, stating, "We cannot succeed ... in Afghanistan by killing Afghan civilians." He continued on, stating, "I would look to 2009 and 2010 to be incredibly important years in Afghanistan.... The violence level is up, the Taliban is much better organized than they were before." To that end, though, noting it may take two years to turn the tide, Mullen refused to rule out the use of unmanned drones, stating, matter of factly, "We can't tie our troops' hands behind their backs." But even with these remarks from the top military official in the US Armed forces, it must still be recognized that the disproportionate firepower of the US effort in the region is shocking to the local officials and, in the end, to international public opinion.

So, when considering the recent change of the rules of engagement in Afghanistan, all of these factors, including international perception, must fall into our engaged assessment and analysis of the calculus of the situation on the ground. In March, when Obama announced his strategy to break Al Qaeda's network through a combination of methods in Afghanistan, he also announced that his administration would update the American people by May as to the progress on the effort.

It should not have come as a shock, then, when General McKiernan's lead role in Afghanistan was shifted in mid-May to General Stanley McChrystal. On June 10th, McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate Committees; five days later he took command. On June 23rd, David Zucchino and Laura King of the LA Times released an article entitled "U.S. to limit airstrikes in Afghanistan to help reduce civilian deaths" which laid out McChrystal's preparations to shift the ROE in a "tactical directive" primarily focusing on air support and search and seizure methodology for ground operations, an announcement of intention, which was coordinated with the arrival of Afghanistan and Pakistan officials to the Washington D.C. party set.

Zucchino and King note that "Airstrikes accounted for 64% of the 828 civilians killed last year by U.S. or Afghan government forces, according to a recent United Nations report," and continue, "The Taliban and other insurgents were responsible for an additional 1,160 civilians deaths." By this UN estimate, then, the US occupational effort in Afghanistan is 40% of the problem and the Taliban insurgency is 60% of the problem. As to the change in the Rules of Engagement, the article states, "The directive orders commanders to be more judicious when calling in airstrikes. The goal is to restrict close air support to situations in which U.S. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, or Afghan army or police units, are in imminent danger of being overrun."

Moreover, the article notes that if hostiles enter a structure in which it cannot be determined if civilians are present, the military is to retreat; similar guidelines are erected on search and seizure operations and convoy protection methodology. One of McChrystal's staffers, who wished to remain anonymous noted that the intent "is to use proportional force."

McChrystal also has spoken at length in various forums that his success in Afghanistan will be measured by how many civilians are shielded from harm rather than how many Taliban and al Qaeda militants are killed. The same anonymous staffer noted that while air support will continue, "the emphasis is on protecting civilians rather than killing insurgents." It is a wonder that the U.S. Government didn't set up big neon flashing signs in Arabic, Urdu and Pashto that say "Take civilian hostages and we will not fire" or "Hide in a house and you will force the coalition to retreat" or "If you want to get the drop on us, make sure you stay in an urban setting". The McChrystal directive is the ultimate in hand tying of U.S. soldiers in the Afghanistan theatre - exactly what Mullen warned against on the Predator debate. Is it any wonder, then, that US casualties in July are spiking to record levels?

The McChrystal directive is designed to do one thing - level the playing field in the perception of the international community. The shift in the Afghanistan ROE is designed to engender soft power dividends, letting the world know that we are using the most humane methods possible, placing Coalition soldiers at severely increased risk rather than utilizing disproportional force.

Another "wrong reason" our troops are dying in Afghanistan, then, is to create the perception that the United States fights war, humanely. This twisted rationale is based on the notion that popularity is just as important as victory. Absurdity is too light a description of the McChrystal tactical directive, but it fits in with the overall Obama strategy of rebuilding America's image in the world, especially the Muslim World.

So, in definitional terms, our troops are dying in a war against extremists rather than radical jihadists, which leads to the promotion of what the Afghan citizens view as a corrupted Shariah Law beholdened to Western interests.

In strategic terms, our troops are dying to create stability zones in which development will yield a handful of international NGO slushfunds.

In tactical terms, our troops are dying to project soft power in a popularity contest that turns our soldiers into targets rather than liberators. Our troops are dying for all of the wrong reasons and that provides aid and comfort to the enemy.

Al Qaeda's jihad, after 7 years, has achieved its aim: it has separated reason from the minds of those in charge of the United States Government and Military apparatus. Victory is a word that has been replaced by the word Success; and, each piece of the comprehensive AfPak policy holds a leader with a different metric of this Success. This is not the language of war, it is the language of Bureaucracy.

GHJJ (4:20amEST)
____________________
 Leave a COMMENT.

powered by [ stevencopley.com ]