Knowing Al Qaida

Posted by johnhouk on Jun 23, 2007
June 22, 2007

Does anyone in America comprehend al Qaeda other than they are a group of terrorist that attacked the American Homeland by a homicidal suicide attack commission by nominal leader Usama bin Laden?

The reason al Qaeda is a successful terror organ is its innovative complex structure that America has not deciphered as yet to terminate.

James J. F. Forrest provides insight into the four dimensions of al Qaeda. It is unfortunate that the Forrest does not use this insight of “Knowing al Qaeda” to develop a means to end viable destroy the global murderers.

JRH
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Knowing Al Qaida

By James J.F. Forest | June 22, 2007
Accuracy in Media

It's Tuesday morning, and a terrorist attack has just taken place in Casablanca, the capital of Morocco. My office telephone is ringing; it's a reporter who wants me to go on record saying whether this is or is not an attack by al Qaida. Unfortunately, answering that question with any accuracy has become increasingly complicated, but I and my colleagues at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) are committed to helping the media and the general public understand all we can about the threat we face from al Qaida's ideology and strategic objectives. We take Sun Tzu's advice of "know your enemy" quite seriously.

As CTC Senior Fellow and terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman explains in his recently revised book, Inside Terrorism, as well as in his testimony to Congress earlier this year, al Qaida should be viewed not as a normal organization, but as a globally-networked movement with at least four dimensions. Hoffman's analysis provides the framework for one of the seminars the CTC is teaching to FBI field agents at various Joint Terrorism Task Force locations around the country, and is worth recounting here for those unfamiliar with it.

To begin with, it is important to recognize that only one of the four dimensions of al Qaida provides any semblance of traditional command and control within the movement. This so-called "al Qaida central" is comprised of leftover leaders of the pre-9/11 organization, ostensibly led by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and a small cadre of others, believed to be hiding in the mountainous border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This dimension of al Qaida may be actively engaged in commissioning some attacks, directing surveillance and collating reconnaissance, planning operations, and approving their execution. But the importance of these individuals to the overall objectives of al Qaida is actually limited in comparison to the other three dimensions of the movement.

The second dimension of al Qaida is comprised of formally established insurgent or terrorist groups like those mentioned above, who have received training, arms, money, "spiritual guidance" and other assistance from al Qaida central. These groups are located in dozens of countries across Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.

They include the Islamic Movement of Turkistan, the Jihad Movement (in Bangladesh), Jemaah Islamiyah (in Indonesia), the Abu Sayyaf Group (in Malaysia and the Philippines), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (in the Philippines), the Islamic Army of Aden (in Yemen), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marrocaine (in Morocco), the Groupe Tunisien Islamique (in Tunisia), and an array of militant groups in Kashmir, including Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Harkat al-Mujahideen.

These so-called "al Qaida affiliate groups" -- like Jemaah Islamiyah (in Indonesia), the Islamic Army of Aden (in Yemen), Harkat al-Mujahideen (in Kashmir) and the - Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group - have been responsible for hundreds of terrorist attacks since before 9/11. Because of these groups' ideological (and sometimes logistical) relationship with al Qaida central, we have often attributed these attacks to Osama bin Laden and his close colleagues, regardless of the absence of any direct command or control linkages. This is precisely what bin Laden envisioned for al Qaida -- armed groups inspired to act on behalf of the global movement.

The third dimension of the movement is comprised of dispersed, ad-hoc groupings of al Qaida adherents who may have (or previously had) some direct connection with al Qaida, but are not members of any formal group. There are 2 sub-categories within this dimension: Individuals who have had some prior terrorism experience, and may have been involved in some previous jihadi campaign in Algeria, the Balkans, or Chechnya - or perhaps more recently in Iraq - and may have trained in some al Qaida facility, like in Afghanistan, Yemen or Sudan before 9/11. Examples include Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian who received basic terrorist training in Afghanistan, was given $12,000 in "seed money" along with very non-specific, virtually open-ended targeting instructions before being dispatched to North America, and was arrested in December 1999 at Port Angeles, Washington shortly after he had entered the U.S. from Canada.

Similarly, Kamel Bourgass, the 31 year-old Algerian who was apprehended by British authorities in January 2003 after they discovered ingredients, utensils, and instructions for producing ricin in his apartment, had spent several years in al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. The so-called "Ricin Plot" was initially uncovered by Algerians while interrogating Mohamed Meguerba, a member of a North African criminal network who had also spent time training in Afghanistan. And in August 2004, police in London arrested several young British men of Pakistani origin on various terrorist-related charges--court records indicate they intended to use radioactive "dirty bombs" in a series of attacks against U.S. financial targets, London hotels and train stations. Among those arrested was Dhiren Barot, a Hindu convert to Islam who had trained at camps in Pakistan, Kashmir, Malaysia and the Philippines. Individuals like these are conventionally referred to as "al Qaida operatives" in the mainstream press, although their connection to al Qaida central is minimal.

This dimension of al Qaida also includes a second subcategory, comprised of persons who have not previously fought in any of the contemporary, iconic Muslim conflicts, but have some identified al Qaida connection. Examples here include the suicide bombers who attacked the London underground on July 7, 2005 (two of whom are believed to have received explosives training by an al Qaida operational commander in Pakistan), and the five members of a Pakistani community in Lodi, California, who were arrested by authorities in June 2005 and charged with various offenses related to an FBI anti-terrorism investigation. One of the suspects, 22-year-old Hamid Hayat, admitted in a court affidavit that he had attended an al Qaida-supported camp in western Pakistan and received weapons training. These individuals carry no identifiable "name brand" group affiliation, yet are inspired enough by the ideology of al Qaida to seek advice, training and support from its members.

The fourth dimension of al Qaida includes radicalized individuals who have absolutely no direct connection with al Qaida or any other identifiable terrorist group, but nonetheless are prepared to carry out attacks in solidarity with or support of al Qaida's jihadi agenda. Their relationship with al Qaida is more inspirational than actual. They are typically motivated by a shared sense of enmity and grievance felt towards the United States and West, as well as the apostate regimes it supports, and more generally complain about the oppression of Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere.

An example of individuals in this category is found in last year's so-called "Toronto Plot," in which 12 men and five youths were charged with planning a wave of attacks against Parliament Buildings, CBC Broadcasting Centre, and CSIS offices. The members of the group (all of whom were Canadian born or residents of good standing) have no known direct ties to al Qaida, but were radicalized (both online and by a local extremist cleric) by the messages of bin Laden to the point of attempting to acquire 3 tons of ammonium nitrate (triple the amount used by Timothy McVeigh in his attack against the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City).

Another example is U.S. citizen Daniel Maldonado. Born in Massachusetts and raised in in New Hampshire, Maldonado became active on a web forum of highly conservative Salafis, and moved to Cairo in November 2005. A year later, he was motivated by a video by Ayman al-Zawahiri, released online, calling on Muslims to strike at America's underlings in Somalia, and eliminate the "Zionist-Crusader" presence in the country. Maldonado's journey from young American in New England to jihadi in the Horn of Africa was cut short by malaria, contracted while undergoing weapons and explosive training, and he was arrested by Kenyan authorities after fleeing Somalia

Altogether, these four dimensions of al Qaida escape any sort of simplified description or sound byte for the news media. But instead of providing the public with a thorough understanding of this complex phenomenon, it is not uncommon for news media to apply the al Qaida label to any terrorist attack by religious extremists. Unfortunately, however, every time the media reports an incident as an al Qaida attack, al Qaida benefits. A primary objective of Osama bin Laden has always been to encourage and facilitate a worldwide Islamic revolution--to launch a socio-political action movement of global proportion, and to inspire, motivate and animate radicalized Muslims to join the movement's fight. Join the Jihad. Think globally, act locally. These are the messages of al Qaida's massive strategic communications effort. Each act of political violence attributed to al Qaida, rightly or wrongly, contributes to the image of al Qaida as a global movement.

This image is further emboldened when armed groups declare a formal affiliation with al Qaida--like al-Tawhid Wal Jihad, the Iraqi group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi which officially merged with al Qaida in 2004; or the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (formerly known by their French acronym GSPC) in Algeria, which formally changed its name to al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb earlier this year. By declaring their affiliation with al Qaida, these groups stand to gain legitimacy within the global Jihadi movement, increase the size and influence of their logistics and support networks, and become more attractive to potential recruits. In turn, these newly affiliated groups increase the influence and size of al Qaida, providing it with branches (or franchises) in new locations through which the arena for Jihad can be expanded. To the degree that Osama bin Laden is able to co-opt the mostly local agendas of these groups and channel their efforts towards the cause of global jihad, he is able to create a global jihadi "critical mass" from these geographically scattered, disparate movements that he hopes will one day coalesce into a single, unstoppable force.

Much to the chagrin of the counterterrorism community, al Qaida has at the very least achieved its goal of creating global awareness of its existence and the grievances against the West and against apostate regimes in the Muslim world upon which its ideology of violent action is based. This ideology explains to confused and angry Muslim youth why the world seems to be such a miserable place, and offers guidance on how to fix it for future generations. Some followers of the ideology are then motivated to attack the West because the West remains the key obstacle to the achievement of the strategic objectives articulated in the movement's ideology. This is the heart of the global terrorist threat we now face.

Overall, according to some observers, al Qaida has succeeded in establishing at least the perception of global presence. If this is transformed into global action by more individuals seeking to advance al Qaida's objectives, we will truly be in dire straits.

It is now Thursday afternoon. A terrorist attack has just taken place in Algiers, the capital of Algeria. My phone rings: it's another reporter.

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* The views expressed are those of the author and not of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Military Academy, or any other U.S. Government agency.

The original article can be found at http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/

FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor James Forest, Ph.D., is Associate Professor at the United States Military Academy, West Point, and Director of Terrorist Studies at the Combating Terrorism Center. The views expressed are those of the author and not of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Military Academy, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

© 2007 Accuracy In Media, All Rights Reserved.